Zombie Mohammed Case

There has been quite a kerfuffle over the Internet concerning the "Mohammed Zombie" judge. Some claim that this judge was enforcing Sharia law. Some have claimed that the judge admitted to being Muslim. some have claimed that this judge harangued the victim. None of these is true based upon a recording of the trial made by the victim.

 The basic facts are these. On Halloween night, the victim was in a parade dressed as a zombie mom and on the theory that in the Koran it says that Mohammed was raised from the dead and walked among the living, and therefore he must've been a zombie.  [I don't think the Koran says that, but no matter.]  The defendant Taraaq confronted the victim at the parade. According to the victim, Taraaq grabbed him and turned him around and tried to choke him. Both parties called the police. The responding officer says that Taraaq did not recall precisely what happened, but admitted touching the victim. Taraaq was charged with harassment, the operative terms of which statute are as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person: (1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same; ....

The trial was apparently held in a court not of record where the police officer acted as the prosecutor. Taraaq was defended by a lawyer. The judge found Taraaq not guilty for failure of the state to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt due to conflicting testimonies. The judge calmly lectured the victim about sensitivity to persons of Islamic cultures, but never similarly lectured the defendant Taraaq about the rights under the First Amendment to insult religion. Here is an audio of the entire trial:
 

 To those who suggest that the judge admitted to being a Muslim, I say that the judge's comment has been misconstrued and should appropriately be understood to be a colloquialism in form.  It should be understood to mean, "[If] I am a Muslim, I find it offensive."

 This Internet controversy and the many threats to the judge's security (he has been moved to another County for security purposes) would never have happened if the judge, after lecturing the victim, had turned to the defendant and said something like,

"While I find that the government did not meet its burden of proof to convict you of this crime, I must warn you that here in America the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects every person's right to speech, including speech that insults another's religion. While I do not approve of speech that offends other people, in the religions are allowed otherwise, you Mr. truck must realize that if you are going to be in the United States, you must be prepared to tolerate speech that insults Islam, just as you must expect others to tolerate speech that insults Christianity or Judaism. It is never appropriate in the United States to touch another in response to an insult to your religion. That is just not the way things are done here."

I think the judge made an error in judicial judgment by not lecturing the defendant after choosing to lecture the victim in this case. I do not think that means that the judge is applying Sharia law or giving some advantage to Muslims merely for being Muslims. The case has been seriously exaggerated in the conservative blogosphere.

The judge gave the appearance, however, of partiality when he lectured only the victim. I hope the judge has learned a lesson and takes this to heart.

Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action ... v. Regents of the University of Michigan

In a case that sets the 14th Amendment squarely on its head, in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights And Fight For Equality By Any Means Necessary (Bamn) et al. v. Regents of the University of Michigan et al, ___ F. 3d ___ (7/1/2011), the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals holds that a state may not ban discrimination on the basis of race if the ban results in minorities not being able to be the beneficiaries of racial discrimination.

In 2006 the citizens of Michigan voted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, including preferences, by a referendum proposition that read,

(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community college, or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education or public contracting.

(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.

(3) For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or community college, school district, or other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the State of Michigan not included in sub-section 1.

In a 2 to 1 decision, in bafflingly obtuse language, the majority suggested that the proposition "works as a reallocation of political power or reordering of the political process to place 'special burdens' on racial minorities."

Huh?

How is it possible, logically or practically, that eliminating preferences places special burdens on minorities? The only "burden" is a prohibition upon race-based preferences.

In my view, discrimination on the basis of race is wrong. Period.

In a university admissions policy, for example, there are as fixed number of admissions available. preferring one race necessarily discriminates against another. However the elites may think it benefits society to have racial quotas, from the standpoint of the student refused admission to support another's preference, it is wrong, pure and simple.

In its analysis, the majority said that because the proposition classified on the basis of race, the court had to strictly scrutinize the legislation. The majority had the legal analysis exactly backward. As the dissent pointed out:

“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). We apply strict scrutiny to those laws that racially classify individuals, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 216 (1995), and intermediate scrutiny to those laws that classify individuals based on gender, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). Racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny if (1) the law classifies on its face or (2) the law has a discriminatory impact and a discriminatory purpose. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241. The district court concluded that Proposal 2, which prohibits racial classifications, a fortiori does not classify facially on the basis of race. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 951. Although the district court did find “sufficient evidence to establish a fact question on the disparate impact part of the test,” it did not find a discriminatory purpose. Id. Indeed, it stated that “the demonstration of a discriminatory purpose . . . dooms [the] conventional equal protection argument.” Id. Furthermore, the district court found the equal protection argument based on gender “even less compelling” due to the less exacting level of scrutiny. Id. at 952. I agree with the conclusions of the district court.

Proposal 2 does not establish a facial racial classification because its text does not draw distinctions on the basis of race; in fact, it prohibits them. Additionally, Proposal 2 does not classify racially on an impact theory because it lacks a discriminatory purpose. “[A]bsent a referendum that facially discriminates racially, or one where although facially neutral, the only possible rationale is racially motivated, a district court cannot inquire into the electorate’s motivations in an equal protection clause context.” Arthur v. Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, no heightened level of scrutiny need be applied to Proposal 2, and under rational basis review, Proposal 2 is easily justifiable. Proposal 2 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause under the conventional analysis.

How can a state law prohibiting racial discrimination, but either placing burdens upon or preferring minorities ever be a race based classification? It can't, except in the Orwellian world of the progressives.

I think the Supreme court will likely take this case for review, because it is so high-profile and so important.

Click on the title of the case for a .pdf of the whole thing.

Flawed Justice System

From a Mark Steyn comment on the NRO site,

A New Hampshire neighbor of mine had the misfortune to attract the attention of federal prosecutors for one of those white-collar “crimes” no one can explain in English. The jury acquitted him in a couple of hours. Great news! The system worked! Not really. By then, the feds had spent a half-decade demolishing his life, exhausting his savings, wrecking his marriage, and driving him to attempt suicide. He’s not a big scary businessman like Conrad, just a small-town nobody. And he’ll never get his life back. Because, regardless of the verdict, the process is the punishment — which is the hallmark of unjust justice systems around the world.

Mr. Steyn nails a major defect in the American justice system. Best in the world, maybe .. maybe not. I have not studied all other justice systems.

Our system is terrible unless they prosecutors act with an intellectual honesty that is massively hard for the human brain to accomplish. The prosecutors become buddies with the police and more aligned with the police than is healthy for their independence. The prosecutors get in tight with the judges, because they see the same judges day after day. they ear more deference, frequently, than defense counsel. It is not a deliberate unequal deference by the judges, but a psychologically, the judges are inclined to cut prosecutors more slack.

The prosecutors have the power to over charge a defendant to put undue pressure for the innocent to plead guilty. They have the power to grant leniency or immunity to criminals to get their testimony (and give the criminals incentive to lie).

Juries are unpredictable, but I have seen juries fail to give the benefit of reasonable doubt. After all, the police would not have charged the defendant if he weren't guilty, they seem to think.

Police have the power to continue questioning the innocent (who do not exercise their rights to remain silent or to counsel (because, being innocent, they have nothing to fear, do they), until exhausted and under pressure they falsely confess. It happens more often than one would think.

For more information on how to conduct yourself when dealing with police, see the videos here and here.

State v. Barnes Update

In State v. Barnes, the Indiana Supreme Court overturned hundreds of years of precedent to allow the prosecution of a resident in his home who resisted an illegal entry by the police on which I reported here.

Here is a protest in Indiana against that decision:

Hate Crime: Saudi Woman Spits on Fellow Customer at Walmart

I am not a fan of hate crime enhancements.  What this woman did was awful, but it should not be a felony.



More on the story from The Blaze.

Kentucky v. King: Welcome to the Police State

In Kentucky v. King, the United States Supreme Court continued the judicial encroachment on our fundamental freedoms. here are the facts from the court's syllabus:

Police officers in Lexington, Kentucky, followed a suspected drug dealerto an apartment complex. They smelled marijuana outside anapartment door, knocked loudly, and announced their presence. As soon as the officers began knocking, they heard noises coming from the apartment; the officers believed that these noises were consistent with the destruction of evidence. The officers announced their intent to enter the apartment, kicked in the door, and found respondent andothers. They saw drugs in plain view during a protective sweep of the apartment and found additional evidence during a subsequent search. The Circuit Court denied respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that exigent circumstances—the need to pre-vent destruction of evidence—justified the warrantless entry.

The apartment the police entered did not contain the drug dealer they were chasing. But after entry, the police charges these folks who were simply in their own apartment.

The court called this warrantless entry "objectively reasonable."  Really?

State v. Barnes: Government Takes Away Another Freedom

In State v. Barnes, the Indiana Supreme Court overturned 800 years of settled law to find, "We hold that there is no right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by police officers."

That is right. In Indiana, police officers now may enter your home illegally, and you can't resist.

One's home is no longer one's castle, at least not in Indiana.

Ohio still recognizes that a person has a right to resist an unlawful entry, and suggests that the right to refuse an unlawful entry is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (which is supposed to apply even in Indiana): State v. Holmes (9th Dist App.), 2005-Ohio-1632:

{¶16} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution confers the right to refuse consent to enter a residence, and the assertion of that right cannot be a crime. State v. Robinson (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 490, 496 (characterizing the right to resist an unlawful entry as a privilege sufficient to defeat obstruction charge). See, also, Ohio Const. Section 14, Article I. In the present case, the police officers admittedly forced the entry into the home, without justification of either a warrant or any exigent circumstance. Facially, this is an unlawful entry giving rise to a privilege to resist such an entry.

{¶17} Similarly, because the Ohio statute does not prohibit resisting an unlawful arrest under such circumstances, it follows that it will not per se prohibit resisting an unlawful entry. Elyria v. Tress (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 5, 9 (reversing conviction for resisting arrest when police forced entry through defendant's door). See, also, State v. Cummings, 9th Dist. No. 20609, at *13-14, 2002-Ohio-213 (affirming the suppression of evidence obtained after a similar forced entry). Therefore, if we are to follow our prior holdings, we must conclude that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a necessary element of the crime of which Mr. Holmes was convicted, i.e., lawfulness of the officer's entry and absence of privilege. In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.

There is an interesting discussion of State v. Barnes at The Volokh Conspiracy in the comments section. On commenter quotes an Indiana statute that specifically authorizes resistance to an unlawful entry. I guess the court simply magically created a exception for unlawful entry by police.

Any police entry by force causes me serious concern, both for the occupant and for the police. If the police do the right thing and announce themselves as police before entering sometimes violently, how is the homeowner to know it is really the police? How do they know it is not home invaders claiming to be police?

I know of arrests witnessed by people whose observations I trust. Aside from the automobile stop alongside the road, there is usually no good reason for a violent arrest tactic when the offender is not resisting. Unnecessary violence creates resistance, doesn't it? In more cases than not, the alleged offender will show up voluntarily at the police station just to avoid a violent arrest. I understand concerns for police safety, but there must be a better way than police exercising violent to arrest a passive alleged offender. It gives police a bad reputation, I think.

Lawyers and Justice

This is an interesting discussion from a PBS program "The Open Mond" about 30 years ago. This dicussion is about justice and the law. It is about our system and about the lawyers role in seeking the truth ... or not. It presents issues as fresh today as when originally broadcast. By presenting this video, I do not necessarily agree with everything Judge Frankel says, but it is extremely thought-provoking and highly recommended for anyone seeking justice from the law and from the courts:

Watch the full episode. See more The Open Mind.

Commandeering the People: Popular Sovereignty and the Individual Insurance Mandate

Sit back and enjoy this hour, twenty-three minutes:

The Principles of '98

Our government schools apparently no longer teach the Principles of '98, a landmark event in American Constitutional history. These principles were actually legislative actions of Kentucky and Virginia in 1798 asserting the states' right to ignore unconstitutional act by Congress, in this case the hated Alien and Sedition Acts that criminalized any criticism of Congress or the President. Here is an interesting video on the Principles of '98:



Many Blacks have been brainwashed into thinking that "states rights" and nullification were about slavery. Remember that before the Civil War, Massachusetts attempted nullification asserting its state's rights to oppose slavery, specifically the federal Fugitive Slave Act.

State of Wisconsin v. Joshua J. Schultz

A Judge in the Circuit Court of Clark County Wisconsin has struck down Wisconsin's prohibitions on concealed carry in State of Wisconsin v. Joshua J. Schultz. Click on the case name for a copy of the opinion. Among other things, the court described to overbroad prohibitions of Wisconsin's law:,

Heller and McDonald, recognize the fundamental and personal right written, in plain English, in the Second Amendment. These two decisions reinforce the need for the sec. 941.23 to be narrowly tailored and, in addition, the least restrictive means of the State achieving its goal. The statute is neither. As written, sec. 941.23:

1. Prohibits a gun or knife owner from storing his weapons out of plain sight, such as in a gun cabinet, closet or drawer in his own home.
2. Prohibits a store owner from storing his weapons out of plain sight at his place of business, a store in a “rough” neighborhood.
3. Prohibits the logger, hiker, cross country skier and other outdoors person from keeping his weapon out of plain sight, but available, in the event of a wolf, bear or other wild animal attack.
4. It prohibits judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, court staff and child support agency workers (and many others) that have received legitimate death threats from carrying a concealed weapon for personal safety.

The court could continue this list ad infinitum

The holding:

In sum, sec. 941.23 is unconstitutional on its face as overly broad in violation of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

US Constitution Series, Amendment XXVII

Amendment XXVII. Congressional Pay Limitation

No law varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened

This prevents Representatives from from voting pay raises for themselves without an intervening election. Of the 435 seats, in a normal election, close to 400 seats are relative safe for incumbents. There are many fewer safe seats this year (maybe 336), but at least if the voters get outraged by a voted pay raise, it has the opportunity to vote the bums out. Senators, apparently because they have the longer six year terms, are no so handicapped.

US Constitution Series, Amendment XXVI

Amendment XXVI. Reduction of Voting Age Qualification

SEC. 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

The older I get, the more foolish this amendment seems.

I remember in November 2004 standing in a long line waiting to vote. A young woman voting for the first time was there. She had no idea who to vote for in any race but president. A Democratic operative deliberately and in violation of the election law solicited her vote for Democratic candidates. It was disgusting. Not only was the Democratic operative disgusting, but it was disgusting that anyone would go in to the voting booth totally clueless on the candidates who were running and for what offices. (I understand that there are often many minor candidates, but each election is important. Too many people vote simply on the name. "Brown" is a big one in Ohio. No one should get elected merely because they were born with the right last name.)

Of course, this problems is not simply about recent high school graduates from union-dominated, government schools. I cringe every time I hear some vacuous television person urge everyone to get out and vote.

No. Get out and learn about the candidates and issues. After you have worked hard and gathered enough information to have an informed vote, then and only then go vote.

US Constitution Series, Amendment XXV

Amendment XXV. Presidential Vacancy, Disability, and Inability

SECTION. 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

SECTION. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

SECTION. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

SECTION. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

After providing for appointment of a new vice president after the vice president assumed the office of president, this amendment provides the procedure, including a procedure for permanent removal of the president in the event of a disability preventing the president from performing the duties of the office. "disability" is undefined and its determination is left up to the vice president, a committee of executive officers, and then 2/3 of both houses of the Congress. Note, it does not say 2/3 of each house, so apparently the houses would combine and vote as one.

I see potential interpretation problems on the "majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide." Who are these "principal officers?" When may congress provide for "such other body?" After the problem has arisen?

Could this amendment be used as an excuse to get rid of a bad president?

US Constitution Series, Amendment XXIV

Amendment XXIV. Abolition of the Poll Tax Qualification in Federal Elections

SEC. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

The poll tax was used to prevent poor blacks (and other poor people) from voting.

US Constitution Series, Amendment XXIII

Amendment XXIII. Presidential Electors for the District of Columbia

SEC. 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

This amendment gives the District of Columbia influence in the election for president and vice president out of proportion to its population. Why? It get three electors, as many as the smallest state. All states regardless of size get two electors plus electors equal to the number of representatitves (Article I, Section 1), a minimum of three. Thus mathematically, small states and the District of Columbia have electoral influence out of proportion to their size.

US Constitution Series, Amendment XXII

Amendment XXII. Presidential Tenure

SECTION. 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President, when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

This amendment was proposed and ratified after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was elected to four terms.

Under this amendment, neither Bill Clinton, nor Jimmy Carter nor George Bush may be elected president again. Reading the language, though, a question is raised. If Bill Clinton were elected vice president (which is not expressly prohibited), could Bill Clinton, having been elected president twice, become president again if the president dies in office? I think the answer is no based upon the Twelfth Amendment, but the answer is not entirely clear.

US Constitution Series, Amendment XXI

Amendment XXI. Repeal of Eighteenth Amendment

SEC. 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

SEC. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

SEC. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

Section 1 is good, but section 2 has been the cause of a horrible patchwork quilt of state liquor laws, and has been thought to authorize discriminatory commerce practices otherwise invalid under the commerce clause.

In 2005, the Supreme court reigned in some of the patchwork craziness in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), holding,

States have broad power to regulate liquor under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. This power, however, does not allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers. If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the need for discrimination, New York and Michigan have enacted regulations that disadvantage out-of-state wine producers. Under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these regulations cannot stand.

Wine lovers rejoiced!

US Constitution Series, Amendment XX

Amendment XX. Terms of President, Vice President, Members of Congress: Presidential Vacancy

SECTION. 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

SEC. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.

SEC. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

SEC. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.

SEC. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

US Constitution Series, Amendment XIX

Amendment XIX. Women's Suffrage Rights

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Women got the right to vote. Some women have been real assets in the political arena. Others voted for Nancy Pelosi and Mary Jo Kilroy.